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von Hippel and Trivers propose that self-deception has evolved to facilitate the 
deception of others. However, they ignore the subjective moral costs of 
deception and the crucial issue of credibility in self-deceptive speech. A self-
signaling interpretation can account for the ritualistic quality of some self-
deceptive affirmations, and for the often-noted gap between what self-deceivers 




Commentary on von Hippel & Trivers 
‘The lady doth protest too much, methinks.’ 
 
 ~ Hamlet Act 3, scene 2, 222-230 
 
‘Like every politician, he always has a card up his sleeve; but unlike the others, he thinks the 
Lord put it there.’  
 
 ~ Bertrand Russell, citing Labouchere on Gladstone, ‘Unpopular Essays’ 
 
 
The notion that overly vehement avowals and overly emphatic behaviors betray 
knowledge of a disavowed reality is not new. In Hamlet, the lady’s vow of 
fidelity to her husband is so passionate and insistent as to arouse suspicion. One 
possibility is that she is a pure hypocrite, attempting to deceive her audience 
while knowing full well that her feelings are otherwise. A less cynical observer, 
however, might conclude that she is only attempting to deceive herself. 
 
For von Hippel and Trivers (hereafter vH&T), self-deception and other-
deception are not mutually exclusive possibilities. Their evolutionary claim is 
that the former has evolved in order to facilitate the latter. As they acknowledge, 
this claim has received surprisingly little attention in the empirical literature 
(but see McKay & Dennett, 2009), which makes the hypothesis almost entirely 
speculative but not for that reason any less interesting. 
 
The aspect that we focus on here is the psychological architecture that enables 
self-deception. Although vH&T endorse a ‘non-unitary mind,’ defined by 
separate mental processes with access to privileged information, they resist 
treating these processes as fully-fledged sub-agents with distinct interests, 
decision roles and modes of interaction. Consequently, their theory leaves 
unresolved the crucial issues of author, audience, and credibility in self-
deceptive speech. 
 
Observe, first, that for vH&T the benefits of self-deception are defined as 
performance enhancement: The ‘self-deceived deceiver’ puts on a smoother 
show and makes fewer slips that might give the game away. What seems to be 
ignored in this performance-centered account is the moral dimension of 
deception. One may ask why psychopathy is not a universal condition if glib 
performance is so valuable from an evolutionary standpoint. 
 
An alternative interpretation is available, namely, that the benefits of self-
deception are realized in the internal moral economy of the self-deceiving 
individual: The conveniently self-deceived deceivers are absolved from the 
burden of dealing with unpleasant awareness of their own treachery (Elster, 
1999). Like Russell’s Gladstone, they have license to deceive others without any 
attendant loss of self-esteem. 
 
On this interpretation, therefore, the motive to self-deceive arises from a desire 
to perceive oneself as a moral agent. There remains the question of whether the 
desire will be satisfied, whether ostensibly self-deceptive judgments and 
affirmations will achieve their goal (Funkhouser, 2005). This issue of self-
credibility can be assessed if we view self-deceptive speech as a form of ’self-
signaling,’ the attempt to convince ourselves that we possess some desired 
underlying characteristic or trait (Mijović-Prelec & Prelec, 2010).  If the self-
signaling attempt does succeed, and the characteristic is also socially desirable, 
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then guilt-free deception of others may follow as a collateral benefit. However, 
even if it fails, and fails repeatedly, that need not remove the compulsion to self-
signal. Ritualistic affirmations may remain in force, even as they fail to convince. 
 
The prediction emerges once we conceptualize self-signaling by analogy to 
signaling between individuals. In theoretical biology, signaling refers to actions 
taken by a sender to influence the beliefs of receivers about the sender’s 
unobservable characteristics, e.g., reproductive quality (Grafen, 1990). The 
sender plays ‘offense’ by emitting signals that exaggerate his qualities; the 
receiver plays ‘defense’ by discounting or ignoring the messages altogether. The 
tug of war between offense and defense encourages futile but costly signaling. 
Even if senders with inferior characteristics do succeed in perfectly emulating 
the signals emitted by their superiors, the receiver, according to theory, will 
takes this into account and will discount the value of the signal accordingly. The 
signaling equilibrium is a losing proposition all round; what makes it ’stick’ is 
the fact that failure to send the mandated signal immediately brands the deviant 
as undesirable. 
 
With self-signaling, this entire dynamic is internalized, and messages conveying 
desired characteristics are reinterpreted as messages to oneself (Quattrone & 
Tversky, 1984; Bodner & Prelec, 2003).  The details of this approach are spelled 
out elsewhere (Mijović-Prelec & Prelec, 2010), but the basic assumption, with 
respect to psychological architecture, is that there is a division of labor between 
a sender-subsystem responsible for authoring signals, and a receiver-subsystem 
responsible for interpreting them. It is crucial that the two subsystems cannot 
share information internally, but only through externalized behavior. 
 
What determines whether attempted self-deception is successful? As in the 
interpersonal case, it all hinges on the credulity of the receiver. If the receiver 
takes the sender’s signal at face value, not discounting for ulterior motives, then 
attempted self-deception will succeed and we have the ‘Gladstone’ mode.  
However, the receiver may also discount the signal. This might occur because 
the receiver has some prior expectation of an ulterior sender motive, or because 
the deceptive sender misjudges the signal strength. Interestingly, however, 
discounting may not eliminate the sender’s motive to self-signal, because self-
serving and pessimistic statements may be discounted asymmetrically (the latter 
lack an obvious ulterior motive). In such cases, self-deceptive speech becomes 
mandatory not because it is believed, but because deviating from the self-
deceptive norm could lead to a catastrophic loss in self-esteem. Self-signaling 
can therefore lead to ritualistic expression that appears self-deceptive on the 
surface, but that may not truly reflect what a person feels. There will be a 
mismatch, often noted in the psychotherapeutic literature (Shapiro, 1996), 
between beliefs-as-expressed, e.g., about ones’ self-esteem, sexuality, future 
prospects, family relationships, etc., and beliefs-as-actually-experienced.  
 
If vH&T’s evolutionary story is right, then individuals who cannot deceive 
themselves will be poor at deceiving others. This would not, however, preclude 
occasional dissociations between self-deception and the deception of others. 
Some individuals with crushing self-doubts may fail to conceal these doubts 
from themselves yet manage to maintain an external façade of confidence. 
Others, with sufficiently credulous receiver sub-selves, may manage to convince 
themselves of their self-worth; if, however, their self-aggrandizing statements 
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ring hollow to others, they may be suspected – and accused - of protesting too 
much. 
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